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Trump linked to Ethiopian airline crash

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13 hours ago, BatteryPowered said:

 

Yep...do you know not a single US airline has had an issue?

 

I know it's anecdotal, but a friend is a recently retired international pilot.  He said the heart of the issue is Boeing (and other airline manufacturers) are attempting to make jets as automated as possible because pilots in many parts of the world are nowhere close in skill level to pilots in the US, Great Britain, France and other similar countries.  When you combine that with the almost non-existent correction time in these two crashes, maybe the fleet doesn't need to be grounded...pilots need to be better trained and not let the computer do most of the flying.

 

 

I can appreciate where you're coming from, but it's not accurate. Fortunately, no one has lawn darted one in the US...but there has been problems.

 

There's a ton that's been wrong about this set-up. Airline influence to save money, Boeing wanting to meet the airlines needs financially, design issues, and the FAA signing off on this thing with some glaring holes - undoubtedly in part due to Boeing's clout in the aviation sector.

 

The biggest red flag, which has opened up the rabbit hole - was post LA crash - that is when the MCAS system became known to the airlines, and most importantly - the guys up front driving. The system was not described in any AFM's nor any FCOM's. That's about as Bad worded up as it can get. Apparently Boeing decided, and then convinced the FAA - that airlines and most importantly - crews - didn't need to know about it. Think about that one for a second.

 

Consider this Boeing response initially after the LA crash::

 

"Since it operates in situations where the aircraft is under relatively high g load and near stall, a pilot would never see the operation of MCAS. As such, Boeing did not include a MCAS description in its FCOM".

 

In all my years of operating turbine equipment, I've never heard of such an outrageous situation. This system takes input from two AOA's, and it apparently doesn't cut itself out of the loop if it's receiving faulty input from one (or both) AOA's. Absolutely unheard of with any other system.

 

I could write a ton about this, but rest assured - the almighty dollar / greed drove this to this point.

 

As far as no issues.....here's some NASA ASRS's in the US regarding the bird:

Quote


ACN: 1597380

Time / Day

Date : 201811

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Weather Elements / Visibility : Rain
Weather Elements / Visibility : Snow

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Component

Aircraft Component : Autoflight System
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 626
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1597380
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Other Automation
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : FLC Overrode Automation
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Result.Aircraft : Equipment Problem Dissipated

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

It was day three of six for me and day three with very good FO (First Officer). Well rested, great rapport and above average Crew coordination. Knew we had a MAX. It was my leg, normal Ops Brief, plus I briefed our concerns with the MAX issues, bulletin, MCAS, stab trim cutout response etc. I mentioned I would engage autopilot sooner than usual (I generally hand fly to at least above 10,000 ft.) to remove the possible MCAS threat.

Weather was about 1000 OVC drizzle, temperature dropping and an occasional snow flake. I double checked with an additional personal walkaround just prior to push; a few drops of water on the aircraft but clean aircraft, no deice required. Strong crosswind and I asked Tug Driver to push a little more tail east so as not to have slow/hung start gusts 30+.

Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to "up" and above clean "MASI up speed" with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called "DESCENDING" followed by almost an immediate: "DONT SINK DONT SINK!"

I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb. Now, I would generally assume it was my automation error, i.e., aircraft was trying to acquire a miss-commanded speed/no autothrottles, crossing restriction etc., but frankly neither of us could find an inappropriate setup error (not to say there wasn't one).

With the concerns with the MAX 8 nose down stuff, we both thought it appropriate to bring it to your attention. We discussed issue at length over the course of the return to ZZZ. Best guess from me is airspeed fluctuation due to mechanical shear/frontal passage that overwhelmed automation temporarily or something incorrectly setup in MCP (Mode Control Panel). PM's callout on "descending" was particularly quick and welcome as I was just coming back to my display after looking away. System and procedures coupled with CRM (Resource Management) trapped and mitigated issue.

Synopsis

B737MAX Captain reported an autopilot anomaly in which led to an undesired brief nose down situation.

 

ACN: 1597286

Time / Day

Date : 201811

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase : Takeoff
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Component

Aircraft Component : Autopilot
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Malfunctioning

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 511
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1597286
Analyst Callback : Attempted

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

Day 3 of 3 departing in a MAX 8 after a long overnight. I was well rested and had discussed the recent MAX 8 MCAS guidance with the Captain. On departure, we had strong crosswinds (gusts > 30 knots) directly off the right wing, however, no LLWS or Micro-burst activity was reported at the field. After verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior to the GPWS sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. We discussed the departure at length and I reviewed in my mind our automation setup and flight profile but can't think of any reason the aircraft would pitch nose down so aggressively.

Synopsis

B737 MAX First Officer reported that the aircraft pitched nose down after engaging autopilot on departure. Autopilot was disconnected and flight continued to destination.

 

ACN: 1593021

Time / Day

Date : 201811

Place

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Parked

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 21200
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 178
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 3342
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1593021
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Manuals

Narrative: 1

This was the first flight on a Max for both pilots. Unfamiliarity with flight deck displays led to confusion about display annunciations and switch function. The Flight Manual does not address at least one annunciation, or the controls for the display—or if it does, neither pilot could find the explanation. I have spent literally days looking for an explanation, could not find one, and that is why I wrote this report. It shouldn't be this hard to figure out what I'm looking at.

On the First Officer side ND, on the ground only, there is a MAINT annunciation. We both saw it, couldn't find any immediate explanation for it on the ground, and didn't address it until airborne. I researched the FM (Flight Manual) for an explanation, accomplishing a word search of the term MAINT. There are only two references I could find: the overhead MAINT light (a no go item) and the CDS MAINT light (a QRH item). There is no explanation of the ND MAINT annunciation.

We spent the entire hour flight trying to find the meaning of this annunciation and came up empty handed. We determined to check it out once we landed (if the light came on again). Sure enough, after parking, the MAINT annunciation came back on the ND display. We called Maintenance to check out the light. We waited to make an ELB entry, unsure if one was required. Turned out, an ELB entry was not required.

The mechanic explained the light was part of a menu for maintenance use only on the ground.

In addition, there are two selector knobs that are under-explained (i.e., not explained) in the manual, and we were uncertain what their purpose was. One is under the Fuel Flow switch and the other under the MFD/ENG TFR display switch. These knobs don't seem to work in flight. The First Officer offered to hit the SEL function in flight, to test it out, but I thought something irreversible or undesirable might happen (not knowing what we were actually selecting), so we did not try it out in flight. The mechanic later explained SEL on the First Officer side was used on the ground by maintenance to toggle between the maintenance functions. I forgot to ask what my side did, and still don't know.

Finally, in the Captain's preflight procedure in the bulletin, it says, "Selector... C". What selector is this referring to? Is this the same selector under the Fuel Flow switch, (which is shown in the MAX panels on the L position, as if that is the normal position?) This is very poorly explained. I have no idea what switch the preflight is talking about, nor do I understand even now what this switch does.

I think this entire setup needs to be thoroughly explained to pilots. How can a Captain not know what switch is meant during a preflight setup? Poor training and even poorer documentation, that is how.

It is not reassuring when a light cannot be explained or understood by the pilots, even after referencing their flight manuals. It is especially concerning when every other MAINT annunciation means something bad. I envision some delayed departures as conscientious pilots try to resolve the meaning of the MAINT annunciation and which switches are referred to in the setup.

Synopsis

B737MAX Captain reported confusion regarding switch function and display annunciations related to "poor training and even poorer documentation".

 

ACN: 1593017

Time / Day

Date : 201811

Place

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Flight Phase.Other

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1593017
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Primary Problem : Manuals

Narrative: 1

The recently released 737 MAX8 Emergency Airworthiness Directive directs pilots how to deal with a known issue, but it does nothing to address the systems issues with the AOA system.

MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

This description is not currently in the 737 Flight Manual Part 2, nor the Boeing FCOM, though it will be added to them soon. This communication highlights that an entire system is not described in our Flight Manual. This system is now the subject of an AD.

I think it is unconscionable that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines would have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training, or even providing available resources and sufficient documentation to understand the highly complex systems that differentiate this aircraft from prior models. The fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag. Now we know the systems employed are error prone--even if the pilots aren't sure what those systems are, what redundancies are in place, and failure modes.

I am left to wonder: what else don't I know? The Flight Manual is inadequate and almost criminally insufficient. All airlines that operate the MAX must insist that Boeing incorporate ALL systems in their manuals.

Synopsis

B737MAX Captain expressed concern that some systems such as the MCAS are not fully described in the aircraft Flight Manual.

 

ACN: 1590012

Time / Day

Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 0001-0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Takeoff
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Component

Aircraft Component : Autothrottle/Speed Control
Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Improperly Operated

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 419
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1590012
Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Speed : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

After 1000 feet I noticed a decrease in aircraft performance. I picked up that the autothrottles were not moving to commanded position even though they were engaged. I'm sure they were set properly for takeoff but not sure when the discrepancy took place. My scan wasn't as well developed since I've only flown the MAX once before. I manually positioned the thrust levers ASAP. This resolved the threat, we were able to increase speed to clean up and continue the climb to 3000 feet.

Shortly afterwards I heard about the (other carrier) accident and am wondering if any other crews have experienced similar incidents with the autothrottle system on the MAX? Or I may have made a possible flying mistake which is more likely. The FO (First Officer) was still on his first month and was not able to identify whether it was the aircraft or me that was in error.

Synopsis

B737-MAX8 Captain reported the autothrottles failed to move to the commanded position during takeoff and climb.

 

ACN: 1555013

Time / Day

Date : 201806

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft

Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase : Parked

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 10861
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1660
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1555013
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Training / Qualification

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Pre-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Company Policy
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Manuals
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1

I had my first flight on the Max [to] ZZZ1. We found out we were scheduled to fly the aircraft on the way to the airport in the limo. We had a little time [to] review the essentials in the car. Otherwise we would have walked onto the plane cold.

My post flight evaluation is that we lacked the knowledge to operate the aircraft in all weather and aircraft states safely. The instrumentation is completely different - My scan was degraded, slow and labored having had no experience w/ the new ND (Navigation Display) and ADI (Attitude Director Indicator) presentations/format or functions (manipulation between the screens and systems pages were not provided in training materials. If they were, I had no recollection of that material).

We were unable to navigate to systems pages and lacked the knowledge of what systems information was available to us in the different phases of flight. Our weather radar competency was inadequate to safely navigate significant weather on that dark and stormy night. These are just a few issues that were not addressed in our training.

I recommend the following to help crews w/ their introductory flight on the Max:
Email notification the day before the flight (the email should include: Links - Training Video, PSOB and QRG and all relevant updates/FAQ's)
SME (Subject Matter Expert) Observer - the role of the SME is to introduce systems navigation, display management, answer general questions and provide standardized best practices to the next generation aircraft.

Additionally, the SME will collect de-identified data to provide to the training department for analysis and dissemination to the line pilots regarding FAQs and know systems differences as well best practices in fly the new model aircraft.

Synopsis

B737 MAX First Officer reported feeling unprepared for first flight in the MAX, citing inadequate training.

 

 

Get some popcorn, this is going to be a real sh!t show with a hell of a lot of wide ranging implications when all is said and done.

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On 3/13/2019 at 2:19 PM, personreal said:

"Trump’s shutdown delayed work on a software fix"

 

So they knew there was a problem and flew the planes anyway?

 

Why didn't the dems say something before the shutdown?  

 

Quote

A software fix to this particular flight control feature had been expected early in January, but discussions between the FAA and Boeing dragged on. Officials from various parts of Boeing and the FAA had differing views of how extensive the fix should be.

 

Boeing makes airplanes that don't bounce.

 

 

kj

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"The deadly consequences of Trump’s government shutdown"

 

 

I knew deep down that he was somehow responsible."

 

 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^LOONY TUNES^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

 

giphy.gif&f=1

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4 hours ago, Squatchman said:

  Of course it's Trumps fault.

Plus isn't he in Boeing's back pocket?

Your being facetious, right?

 

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1 hour ago, rick55 said:

Your being facetious, right?

 

While Trump was in Russia colluding with the Russians he sneaked over and installed devices in the Ethiopian planes to make them crash so the Ethiopians wouldnt vote for Democrats in the election.

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On ‎3‎/‎13‎/‎2019 at 5:10 PM, Z09 said:

Maddow?

 

So you blame Trump??

Hey, the New Zealand shooting is Trumps Fault. 

 

LMGDFAO

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On 3/13/2019 at 5:02 PM, drvoke said:

 

 Image result for trump government shutdown cartoon

 

Image result for trump ethiopian airline crash cartoon

 

 

"The deadly consequences of Trump’s government shutdown"

 

 

I knew deep down that he was somehow responsible.

 

 

https://www.politicususa.com/2019/03/12/trump-shutdown-ethiopian-airlines-crash.html

(Full article at above link)

 

News reports on Tuesday revealed that Donald Trump’s government shutdown over his border wall could be to blame for the Ethiopian Airlines crash that claimed the lives of 157 people over the weekend. According to the MSNBC, Trump’s shutdown delayed work on a software fix that would solve what Rachel Maddow called the “unexpected nosedive problem” on the Boeing 737 Max 8.

“You might have thought we got nothing out of the government shutdown as a country, but it turns out not just us but the whole world got something,” Rachel Maddow said. “We got a five-week delay in the implementation of the software that they think will solve the unexpected nosedive problem in the Boeing 737 Max 8 jets. How soon could the software fix have been ready? Should it have been ready before the Ethiopia plane crash this week that killed 157 people? Well, here’s the back story on the timing of when this will be rolled out: A software fix to this particular flight control feature had been expected early in January, but discussions between the FAA and Boeing dragged on. Officials from various parts of Boeing and the FAA had differing views of how extensive the fix should be. U.S. officials also say the federal government’s recent shutdown halted work on the fix entirely for five weeks. So did everybody enjoy their 35-day government shutdown? I mean, you might have thought we got nothing out of that as a country but it turns out not just us but the whole world got something. We got a five-week delay in the implementation of the software that they think will solve the unexpected nosedive problem in the Boeing 737 max 8 jets, and in the meantime, Ethiopia Airlines flight 302 has crashed, killing more than 150 people. The investigation into that crash is now underway, closely on the heels of that other 737 max 8 crash that happened in Indonesia. 

The deadly consequences of Trump’s government shutdown

The short-term consequences of Donald Trump’s government shutdown were bad enough as hundreds of thousands of workers without paychecks were struggling to feed their families or afford health care. But it’s clear that, despite the fact that the shutdown itself ended in late January, there are long-term ramifications that continue to be felt, even if they can sometimes be hard to quantify.

 

 

 

I'm not at all surprised. I knew that. But thanks for the expose'.

 

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29 minutes ago, rick55 said:

Your being facetious, right?

 

no, factacious.

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4 hours ago, Squatchman said:

  Of course it's Trumps fault.

Plus isn't he in Boeing's back pocket?

Yes boeing pwns him.

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4 hours ago, rick55 said:

Damn,

 

I have a hangnail! That funking Trump!

Well you never should have stuck your finger up his arse.

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27 minutes ago, 123urout said:

While Trump was in Russia colluding with the Russians he sneaked over and installed devices in the Ethiopian planes to make them crash so the Ethiopians wouldnt vote for Democrats in the election.

True story^

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26 minutes ago, TBHWT said:

Hey, the New Zealand shooting is Trumps Fault. 

 

LMGDFAO

 

Glad you crossed over to our side.

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On 3/14/2019 at 11:51 PM, LaughinAtLefty said:

 

I can appreciate where you're coming from, but it's not accurate. Fortunately, no one has lawn darted one in the US...but there has been problems.

 

There's a ton that's been wrong about this set-up. Airline influence to save money, Boeing wanting to meet the airlines needs financially, design issues, and the FAA signing off on this thing with some glaring holes - undoubtedly in part due to Boeing's clout in the aviation sector.

 

The biggest red flag, which has opened up the rabbit hole - was post LA crash - that is when the MCAS system became known to the airlines, and most importantly - the guys up front driving. The system was not described in any AFM's nor any FCOM's. That's about as Bad worded up as it can get. Apparently Boeing decided, and then convinced the FAA - that airlines and most importantly - crews - didn't need to know about it. Think about that one for a second.

 

Consider this Boeing response initially after the LA crash::

 

"Since it operates in situations where the aircraft is under relatively high g load and near stall, a pilot would never see the operation of MCAS. As such, Boeing did not include a MCAS description in its FCOM".

 

In all my years of operating turbine equipment, I've never heard of such an outrageous situation. This system takes input from two AOA's, and it apparently doesn't cut itself out of the loop if it's receiving faulty input from one (or both) AOA's. Absolutely unheard of with any other system.

 

I could write a ton about this, but rest assured - the almighty dollar / greed drove this to this point.

 

As far as no issues.....here's some NASA ASRS's in the US regarding the bird:

 

Get some popcorn, this is going to be a real sh!t show with a hell of a lot of wide ranging implications when all is said and done.

 

I want extra butter with mine.

Did you ever hear the one about the guy in the movie with his girlfriend eating buttered popcorn from the popcorn cup in his lap and the girlfriend didn't know that he had punched a hole in the bottom of his cup of buttered popcorn until she reached the bottom of it and grabbed something besides popcorn?

 

If you did then never mind because it's a long story. 

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On 3/15/2019 at 12:30 AM, 123urout said:

"The deadly consequences of Trump’s government shutdown"

 

 

I knew deep down that he was somehow responsible."

 

 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^LOONY TUNES^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

 

giphy.gif&f=1

 

You fukin  RW weirdos would laugh at a dead skunk in the middle of the road. Sheesh! 

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2 hours ago, TDS said:

 

Glad you crossed over to our side.

Trump Derangement Syndrome, taking things out of context. A favorite of lefties.

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42 minutes ago, TBHWT said:

Trump Derangement Syndrome, taking things out of context. A favorite of lefties.

 

I'm proud of it. I'm on a mission from God. 

victory lap

 

VROOM< VROOM!!

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So if the national border emergency is such an emergency why don't we have Ethiopian airlines take over for air Force one?

 

We could save a lot of money on flying Trump around and he might crash

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